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Malet: The FCC's Cable Television Jurisdiction: Deregulation by Judicial

NOTES
THE FCC'S CABLE TELEVISION JURISDICTION:
DEREGULATION BY JUDICIAL FIAT
INTRODUCTION

Well over a decade has elapsed since the Federal Communications Commission first reluctantly asserted jurisdiction over cable television.' During
this period, the FCC's regulation of cable has evolved from a limited attempt
to protect broadcast television from cable television's purported "unfair
competition," 2 to a broad scheme of regulation intended to integrate cable
television service into the national communications system and to obtain
cable television's unique benefits 3 for the public. To these ends, the FCC rules
have included conditions and limitations on cable systems' use of certain
broadcast signals, 4 and requirements that cable systems carry the programs
of public, educational, governmental, and leased access programmers.' The
Commission has also restricted the types of program material that can be
shown by cable companies for a direct charge,6 required that cable systems
obtain "certificates of compliance,"' set technical standards that cable systems
must meet, 8 and set guidelines for the proper scope of state and local regulation. 9
The FCC has thus established itself as the primary source of cable television policy.10 Yet the Commission has assumed the power and responsibility
OEorroR's NOTE: This note was awarded the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice
Prize as the outstanding note submitted by a Senior Candidate in the Spring 1978 Quarter.
I. First Report and Order, Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965) (imposing conditions on cable television's use of microwave transmitters); see also Frontier
Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958).
2. See generally Second Report and Order, In re Amendments to Rules and Regs., 2
F.C.C. 2d 725 (1966); First Report and Order, Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C.
683 (1965). These FCC actions emphasized the "detrimental impact" of cable television on
the broadcast system.
3. 47 C.F.R. §76.1, et seq. (1977). See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and Notice of
Inquiry to Amend Rules and Regs. Relative to CATV, 15 F.C.C. 2d 417 (1968), where
the FCC announced its interest to explore the question of how best to obtain the maximum
benefits of developing cable television technology.
4. 47 C.F.R. §§76,51-.161 (1977).
5. 47 C.F.R. §§76.252-.258 (1977).
6. 47 C.F.R. §76.225 (1977).
7. 47 C.F.R. §§76.11-.29 (1977).
8. 47 C.F.R. §§76.601-.617 (1977).
9. 47 C.F.R. §76.31 (1977).
10. While it may seem appropriate that the FCC, because of its expertise and experience in the communications field, have the primary responsibility for the development
of cable policy, that conclusion should at least recognize the other potential sources of
policy. In particular, local governments have traditionally shown strong interest in cable
regulation and until the broad preemption of their authority by the FCC in 1972, had
been the basic source of public policy in the regulation of cable. The basis for the exercise
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of this position without a legislative commitment of cable television matters
to its jurisdiction,- and without the policy guidelines that normally would be
included in such a delegation of power.11 Instead, the FCC has relied on the
1934 Communications Act,12 which by its terms makes no reference to cable,
as the source of its regulatory authority in this area.13 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has twice cautiously acquiesced in this assumption of power,
reasoning that some regulation of cable was "reasonably ancillary" to the
FCC's mandate under the Communications Act.' 4 In response, Congress has
neither confirmed nor withdrawn cable television from FCC jurisdiction,1
While state and local governments have generally not challenged the jurisdictional boundaries that the FCC has prescribed for their regulatory power. 6
But the apparent quietude in these policy forms - Congress, the Supreme
Court, state and local governments - belies the controversy that has surrounded
the FCC's cable television policies. The cable industry has often opposed the
regulatory burden that has been imposed by the FCC's regulation.17 Voices
of local government authority over cable systems has been their franchising powers, through
which contractual conditions have been imposed on cable systems covering such matters as
channel capacity, service requirements and rates. State governments have also shown -interest in the development of cable television policy. Several have enacted cable television
legislation and established commissions designed to study and make recommendations regarding the regulation of cable television. See generally authorities cited in note 16 infra.
11. See generally GELLHORR AND BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS at 58
(6th ed. 1974) (discussing the delegation principle).
12. Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§151-609 (1970).
13. In the Second Report and Order, In re Amendments to Rules and Regs., 2 F.C.C.
2d 725, 793-95 app. C (1966), where the FCC first asserted jurisdiction over the nonmicrowave aspects of the cable operators activities, the FCC said that its jurisdiction was
based on the "plain language" of §§1, 2, a(a) and 3(b) of the Communications Act. That
argument has never been fully accepted. The source and scope of the FCC's jurisdiction are
still disputed.
14. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
15. Several bills which would have granted the FCC jurisdiction over cable television
systems have been considered by Congress, but none have been enacted. See S. REP. No.
923, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); and H.R. No. 6840, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reconsidered in Hearings on H.R. 7715 Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power
of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965);
Hearings on H.R. 12914, H.R. 13286, and H.R. 14201 Before the House Committee on
Interstate- and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. ' (1966).

16. State and local governments, according' to FCC policy, may regulate the local
incidents of cable television systems. The local incidents include: (1) who gets the

franchise; (2)-how long the'franchise lasts; (3) the area included in the franchise; (4) the
charges and fees, to subscribers; (5) *channel capacity; and (6) use of chdnnels. It is
primarily in the last two areag-channel capacity and use-that issues of conflicting state
and federal goals may, arise. Kahn, Cable -TV. To What Extent May the State Regulate?

49 L.A.B. BULL. 513 (1974). See also, S. RvKIN," CABLE TELEVISION: A GumE TO THE FDERAL
REGULATIONS "(1973); Albert, The Federal*and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 48 U.
,CoLo. L. Riv. 501 (1977); Barnett, State, Federal and Local Regulation of Cable Television,
47 NoR DAME LAwYER 685 (1972); Davis, Cable Television Franchising-The Role of
Local Governments, 51 FLA.' B.J.'78 (19 7): Comment, Regulating CATV: Local Government- and the -Franchising
Process, 19 S:D.L. REv.. 143. (1974).

17. The criticism has been especially vocifer6ti'4mnog Th '-smaller," iidependent" cable
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19
within the academy", and within the government have also been highly
critical of the FCC's rules, often alleging that the major purpose of the FCC's
20
cable regulations has been protection of powerful broadcast industry interests.
As a result, the FCC's regulation of cable television has become a prime target
2
for increasingly popular and effective "deregulation" sentiments.
New pressures have recently emerged to compel the FCC to reconsider
and revise its cable television policies. Congress, although it has not yet

system operators. See, e.g., Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 2223, Copyright Law
Revision, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 615-16 (1975) (testimony of Cooper, Exec. Sec'y of the
Community Antennae Television Ass'n). Cf. Cable Television Report and Order, In re
Amendment Relative to CATV, 36 F.C.C. 2d 143, 205-06 (1972) (cable interests indicated
they would favor increased federal preemption of local regulation). Broadcast interests
have also been dissatisfied at times with the FCC's regulations. See Petition to reconsider
23 F.C.C. 2d 825, 894; 34 F.C.C. 2d 271 (1972), where the broadcasters argued that the pay
cable rules as promulgated were insufficient to protect broadcast interests. The FCC rejected the petition; Cable Television Report and Order, In re Amendment Relative to
CATV, 36 F.C.C. 2d 143, 150-52 (1972), discussing the broadcaster-supported "retransmission
consent" proposal. The proposal was rejected in favor of the broadcast signal carriage rules
when the Commission adopted the Consensus Agreement. Id. at 284-85.
18. See, e.g., Moore, The FCC: Competition and Communications, THE MONOPOLY
MAKERS 35 (1973); Besen, The Economics of the Cable Television "Consensus," 17 J. LAW &
ECON. 39, 46 (1974); Kahn, Cable-, Competition and the Commission, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 854
(1975); Lapierre, Cable Television and the Promise of Programming Diversity, 45 FoRDHA,%I
U.L. REV. 25 (1973); Comment, OTP Cable Proposals: An End to Regulatory Myopia, 24
CATH. U.L. REV. 91 (1974).

19.

See, e.g., P. MAcAvoy,

DEREGULATON

OF CABLE TELEVISION

(Ford Administration

Papers on Regulatory Reform) (1977). Recently, Lionel Van Deerlin (D-Cal.) and Louis
Frey (R-Fla.) introduced legislation in the House of Representatives which would totally
deregulate cable television. Federal Reforms Worry Broadcasters, Tallahassee Democrat, June
19, 1978, at Ila.
20. This passage from Moore, The FCC: Competition and Communications, THE
MONOPOLY MAKERS 35, 65-69 (1973) exemplified the more trenchant line of criticism: "The
FCC's favoritism toward existing broadcasting springs from the premise that its own regulatory duty is to 'guarantee' television for all income groups. . . . Were it not for the Antitrust Division's persistent interest in freeing CATV from competitive restraints, the future
would be far more bleak than it is now. . . . The FCC has proposed to limit the number
of CATV systems in the top markets a corporation can own. . .. But no matter how
competitively independent the CATV franchises become, they will be unable to compete
so long as program exclusivity and signal importation restrictions remain. . . . The ultimate explanation of why restrictions remain traces to the ample political power of the
broadcast industry."
21. The scope of the "deregulation" movement, as well as its philosophy and politics,
may be apprehended by examining, e.g., Schultze, The Public Use of Private Interest,
HARPER'S at 43 (May 1977); Bleiberg, Winds of Change: For Airline Regulation They're
Finally Blowing Hard, BARRON'S July 25, 1977 at 7, col. 1; The Economics for Deregulating
Trucking, Business Week at 56 Nov. 2, 1974; Kane, The CAB Moves to Roll Back Regulatory Powers, Wall St. J., Feb. 14. 1977, at 14, col. 6; Sherman, Applications of the Antitrust
Laws to Regulated Industries, 44 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1976); Struve, The Less RestrictiveAlternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967); Williams,
Big Shippers Push for Decontrol of Truck Industry, Wall St. J., July 6, 1977 at 16, col. 6.
See also Hearings Before the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 1975) (Testimony of D. Baker, Deputy Ass't Att'y
General, discussing deregulation of cable).
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produced a law prescribing the guidelines for cable television regulation, has
finally enacted a statute which addresses the copyright responsibilities of
cable systems that retransmit broadcast signals. 22 Insofar as cable regulation
was originally premised on the unfair competition which cable television
might wage in the absence of copyright liability, the enactment of this
law would seem to require a reconsideration of at least some of the FCC's
rules.2s

Three recent circuit court decisions, each overturning a different portion
of the FCC's cable rules, have also freshened the issue of the proper scope
of the FCC's powers under the "ancillary jurisdiction" doctrine. 24 One of
these decisions, arising in the District of Columbia Circuit, has been denied
certiorari by the Supreme Court.2 5 The third, decided in the Eighth Circuit,
is currently under petition for certiorari, 26 presenting to the Supreme Court
an important opportunity to reconsider its previous decisions as to the scope
of the FCC's power over cable.
This note first explores the policies of the current FCC cable regulations,
most of which were promulgated in 1972. The limitations that have been
placed on the FCC's jurisdiction over cable by Congress and the Supreme
Court are then discussed. Finally, the note analyzes the proper scope of the
FCC's authority in terms of the recent developments in cable television law
with a view toward reconsideration of the Supreme Court's past decisions
in this area.
BACKGROUND

Television programming has often been criticized for offering the "least
objectionable programs" designed for the "least common denominator."21
Limited channels and dependence on advertising, each supportive of network
22. Copyright Law of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §111 (1977).
23. The FCC, in response to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, initiated an
inquiry into the syndicated program exclusivity rules. That inquiry was to have been
completed by early 1978, but its completion has been delayed several times. Notice of
Inquiry to amend §§76.151-.161 of the Commissioner's Cable Television Rules, 41 Fed. Reg.
50,055 (1976). See also Notice of Inquiry into the Economic Relationship between Television
Broadcasting and Cable Television, 43 Fed. Reg. 1542 (1977).
24. Midwest Video Corp. v. F.C.C., 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978); Home Box Office,
Inc. v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. F.C.C.,
533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
25. F.C.C. v. Home Box Office, Inc., U.S.
98 S.Ct. 111 (1977).
26. Midwest Video v. F.C.C., 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W.
3221 (Oct. 3, 1978).
27. See, e.g., P. SANDMAN, MEDIA: AN ITroDUcroRy ANALYSIS 254-58 (1976). H. MARcusE,
AN ESSAY ON LIBERATION 12 (1969) has viewed television as a tool of "organized capitalism"
which is employed "for the advertising of violence and stupidity, for the creation of captive
audiences." THE CoMMrrrEE FOR EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, BROADCASTING AND CABLE TELEVISION: POLICIES FOR DIVERSrT AND CHANGE 12 (1975) has said that television is "the most

effective means yet devised for... the mass merchandising of goods and services." A review
of some statistics may produce some sense of television's impact. By 1975, 97% of the homes
in the United States had television service. The average American watched 3
hours of
television per day. Over the course of any given week, 87% of the population will generally
be exposed to a television. P. SANDMAN, supra, at 64-67, 299-300.
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oligopoly,28 and each having its roots in the technology of broadcasting,29
may be blamed for this mediocrity and lack of diversity in television's program
product.30 Plans to improve the medium within the context of broadcasting
28. High industrial concentration in combination with high entry barriers is often
associated with poor industrial performance, resulting in consistently low outputs,
high
prices and profits, and lack of progressiveness or risk-taking. Lanzillotti, The Economics
of
Antitrust (lecture, Advanced Antitrust Seminar, Holland Law Center, University of
Florida,

Spring 1978). See generally J.

BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

115-24, 251-301, 373-462 (1968).

A high degree of concentration and market power has been recognized both at the
national
level, in network service and in local markets, among broadcast stations. Id. at 145.
See
W.

JONES, CASEs ANT MATERIALS ON ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA: RADIO,
TELEVISION AND CABLE

8 (indicating that the overwhelming majority of television programming actually
viewed is
network originated); P. SANDMAN, supra note 27, at 112 (indicating that 83% of
the 697
television stations operating in the United States in 1973 were network affiliates).
Entry
barriers exist by virtue of the limited number of broadcast licenses issued by the
FCC.
See W. JONES, supra (discussing the law of broadcast licensing); note 29 infra (discussing
the consequences of spectrum .carcity). Entry barriers also exist because network affiliations
are in some degree essential and exclusive. See Note, Antitrust: The Implications
of Television Network Programming, 27 HASTINGs L.J. 1207 (1976). The existence of oligopoly
and
oligopolistic behavior in the television industry is supported by observations that
highly
competitive, highly specialized program production markets are "underemployed"
(B.
OWEN, J. BEE E, & W. HENNING, TELEVISION ECONOMIcs 32-33
(1978) [hereinafter cited as
B. OWENS]) and that consumer demand for television is unfulfilled (Panko, Edwards,
Penchos, g:Russell, Analysis of Consumer Demand for Pay Television (Report
prepared
for the Office of Telecommunication Policy, May 1975) [hereinafter cited as Analysis
of Consumer Demand]).
29. Each broadcast station transmits its signal under FCC license at a specified power
over a designated segment of the electromagnetic spectrum. That spectrum is limited
for
broadcast purposes and thus imposes a limit on the total number of stations that
can
transmit simultaneously in an area. Few cities have more than six television broadcast
stations operating and available under the FCC's present assignment plan. W. JONES,
supra
note 28, at 7. The broadcast media's dependence on advertising is also attributable
partially
to constraints inherent in broadcast technology. The use of the airwaves precludes
broadcasters from making direct collections from viewers for the service of making their
television signals available. The per capita price that a network advertiser will pay
for an
audience is small when compared with the potential of direct payment. Nevertheless,
the
size of a typical national audience makes an advertising "spot" extremely valuable
in
absolute terms. Staff of the Subcommittee on Communications of the House Committee
on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., CABLE TELEvISION: PROMISE VERSUS
REGULATORY PERFORMANCE 62 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
Cable Performance Staff
Report].
30. Because the first stations established in any given city tend to be network affiliates,
and because there are generally fewer than six stations in a given city, the programming
available to viewers is network-originated. The consequences for "diversity" are obvious.
See B. OWEN, supra note 28, at 78. There are essentially two aspects to the criticism
of
advertiser influence. One argues that advertiser support causes the programming of
shows
that reflect advertiser, not -viewer, preferences. See, e.g., B. OWEN, supra note 28,
at 76:
"The signals that enter broadcasters' profit calculations and hence determine programming
patterns are the advertisers' values of exposure to viewers, not the viewers values
of programs." Accord, P. SANDMAN, supra note 27, at 136-37. The other line of argument views
the
advertising messages themselves as a costly intrusion on the viewer. See, e.g., Kozyris,
Advertising Intrusion: Assatlt on The Senses. Trespass on the Mind- A Remedy Through
Separation, 36 OHIo ST. LJ. 299 (1975); Reed, Psychological Impact of Advertising and
the
Need for FTC Regulation, 13 AM. Bus. L.J. 171 (1975). See also Note, Ring around
the
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have either been discarded without any attempt at implementation or have
proved disappointing after substantial periods of experiment. 31 Today it is
widely accepted that cable television offers the most promise for improving
32
the diversity and quality of the television medium.
The "promise" of cable to increase diversity and quality in television is
based largely on its technical capacity to increase the number of useful
channels that can be made available to television service consumers. 33 Increased channel capacity ought to promote more programming for minority
tastes and encourage a more efficient allocation of programming and distribution of resources in the television industry.3 4 But cable enthusiasts have
not restricted their vision of the "wired nation" to the mere broadening and
35
diversification of entertainment material available to television audiences.
Collar, Chain Around Her Neck: A -Proposalto Monitor Sex Role Stereotyping in Television
Advertising, 28 HATNGs L.J. 149 (1976).
31. After the FCC recognized the insufficiency of the spectrum portion originally allotted
to television broadcasting (the 13 VHF channels) it set aside another segment of the
spectrum and created the UHF channels. W. JONES, supra note 28, at 7. ,But UHF has been
largely unsuccessful because of tuning difficulties and because of the FCC's, "localism"
policy. B. OwaN, supra note 28 at 122. See also, notes 60-62, infra and accompanying text.
It has been suggested that the establishment of a fourth network with government
support would counter the market power of the present netwoxks. This, in essence, is the
approach of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§390-97 (1976).
See generally THE COMMTtEE FOR EcoNoMIc DEVELOPMENT, supra note 27, at 45-47 (1975).
The experience with the Public Broadcast System has been disappointing. Id. 48-49, P.
SANDMAN, supra note 27, at 221-22. Pay television in conjunction with- broadcasting appears
unworkable. B. OwEN, supra note 28 at 125-38. There have been several proposals to improve
television service by effectively increasing the number of channels available. UHF itself
provides a channel capacity far in excess of current use. One proposal would attempt to
advance the use of UHF by having the FCC order "deintermixture" of UHF. and VHF and
mandate "click tuning" for UHF channels. Another plan would establish in a few cities
high-power regional stations which would be capable of broadcasting to a larger geographical
area than is now allowed. The use of low power VHF "drop-ins" has also been suggested. Id.
32. See, e.g., Lapierre, Cable Television and the Promise of Program Diversity, 42 FoRDHAm L. REv. 25 (1973); Pearson, Cable: The Thread by Which Cable Television Hangs,
27 RutrmS L. REv. 800 (1974). But see, Kittross, Fair and Equitable Service, or a Modest
Proposal to Restructure American Television to Have All the Advantages Claimed for
Cable and UHF Without Using Either, 29 FED. COM. B.J. 91 (1976).
33. See generally Lapierre, supra note 18, at 31-35. A cable system consists of' an
antenna, a headend and coaxial cable distribution system. The potential of cable to make
available more channels for program distribution lies in the fact that its means of final
transmission is the coaxial cable. Although each coaxial cable is capable of handling only
a limited number of signals, the number of parallel cables can be indefinitely increased. In
contrast, attempts to add more channels to the broadcast spectrum must ultimately result
in cross-channel interference. Of course, cable's potential to increase the number of available channels is effectively no greater than the receiver set's ability to handle the signals.
Thus, the ability of cable to make available a large number of signals on a single dial is
in some way dependent on the state of the technology of the converters that accomplish
this task. At present, a 40 to 52 channel capacity is. seen as the "outer limit" of a cable
system. Id. at 28.
34. B. OwEN, supra note 28, at 77-78.
35. See, e.g., SLOAN COMMISSION, ON THE CABLE: THE TELEvIsIoNOi ABUNDANCE 97-114
(discussing the use of cable for the delivery of. educational, health, and other social services).
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Unlike broadcast television, cable may potentially be able to supply, in addition to enhanced "one-way" service, certain "two-way" services, including
digital subscriber response, 36 voice and video return, 37 subscriber initiation, 3s
and point-to-point services. 9° Additionally, the use of cable may increase the
practicability of "pay television, '' 40 which in economic theory ought to be more
responsive to viewer preferences than advertiser-supported television .'
Reasonable policy analysts, however, necessarily acknowledge that cable's
"promise" has its limits. Cable television systems require vast outlays of
-2
capital and thus may never be economically practical in certain areas.
Additionally, cable operators are generally local monopolists and, as a result,
may have no economic incentive to improve performance beyond providing
the basic programming necessary to attract a large percentage of its potential
43
subscribers.
36. Digital subscriber response is the simplest of the "two-way" services. it would allow
viewers to respond to programs based on binary principles. Voting and responding to true/
false or yes/no questionnaires would be possible.
37. Voice and video return would allow viewers to respond in kind to the source of
the program. In combination with point-to-point service, this feature would essentially
duplicate the videophone service that the telephone companies have unsuccessfully sought
to promote.
38. Subscriber initiation service would allow a viewer actively to select his program
material from a program library. Taken to the logical limit, a person's home television
set could be converted into essentially a remote computer terminal. The cable company's
responsibility, aside from maintenance of the system, might include maintenance and development of a program library.
39. Point-to-point services would allow communications between cable subscribers
analogous to those provided by telephone service, but enhanced by the accessory of the
television screen. Essentially, the point-to-point service is a capability of isolating "conversations" and would eliminate the cable operator as the sole source of programming for
the cable community. Given point-to-point service and "intelligent" television sets or
terminals, persons might play "computer pong" with each other while each is sitting in
his own home.
40. Cable television companies generally charge a flat monthly fee for the basic service
that is provided when a viewer is "hooked up" to the cable. "Pay television" refers to
programming for which an extra charge is levied. Presently companies that offer pay cable
typically provide an optional channel which shows current feature movies. The installation
of metering equipment is also a possibility and would allow charges on a per-program
basis. The pay television concept has also been applied in conjunction with broadcast
transmissions. As such, it is usually called "subscription television," while pay television in
conjunction with cable is usually called "pay cable." Subscription television has not proved
viable in light of the inability to police the black marketing and use of signal decoders,
which allow a non-subscribing television owner to receive subscription television signals.
41. B. OWEN, supra note 28, at 90, concludes: "The pay TV analysis suggests that
both the quantity of resources devoted to television and the specific programs that result
will come closer to approaching the desires of viewers under pay TV than under advertisersupported TV.Furthermore, extensions of the theory of public goals argue that . . . with
unlimited channels, free competitive entry, and pure pay TV, the allocation of resources
might approach an economically affluent level."
42. THE COMMITrEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 27, at 61 (burial of
cable in urban areas is extremely expensive); CABLE PERFORMANCE STAFF REI'ORT, supra
note 29, at 5 (cable is uneconomical in rural areas).
43. Where, without a cable subscription, a viewer would be unable to receive the basic

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

7

Law Review,
Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 3
JURISDICTION
TELEVISION
FCC'S CABLEFlorida
One of the most significant limits on cable television is that cable, in
itself, is merely an innovative distribution technology. 44 So far, at least,
cable systems have primarily relied on retransmission of broadcast signals
for their program material. 45 Although origination cablecasting and satellite
or microwave interconnection of cable systems may eventually lead to greater
diversity,46 cable's primary impact has historically been the delivery of programs that had been available only in large urban areas to audiences living
47
in smaller ones.
complement of three network signals, the provision of those signals would probably be
adequate to attract most of the community's potential subscribers.
44. It has been said that the cable industry's "overwhelming need in the short term
is to obtain the necessary program materials to fill cable's multichannel capacity." THE
COMMITrEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 27, at 68. But insofar as that statement
implies that economic constraints would inhibit program supply to the cable industry, it is
probably incorrect. An analysis of program supply markets indicated that program production
resources are underemployed, are competitive, and would respond to increased demand. B.
OWEN, supra note 28, at 17-36.
45. Consider Gainesville, Florida, which has "all the qualities within it that are
necessary to create a 'Cabletown, USA.'" Roth and Associates, Cable Television in Gainesville and Alachua County, Florida: A Study Prepared for the Gainesville-Alachua County
Utilities Board (Washington, D.C., 1973) (on file in Gainesville municipal library). Without
subscribing to the local cable television service, a Gainesville viewer could receive the
signals of two broadcast stations, one an ABC affiliate and the other an NET station operated
by the state university. By subscribing to cable-as 18,500 households in that city do - a
viewer gains access to two NBC signals, one CBS signal, two more ABC signals, and one
more NET affiliate, originated in cities larger than Gainesville and located within a radius
of 150 miles. Id. Only recently, in response to public pressure and in exchange for a rate
increase, the cable company began to import an Atlanta-originated station transmitted by
satellite and with a non-network format. University City Television Cable Company Operations (Semi-annual report submitted to Gainesville-Alachua County Regional Utilities
Board, Oct. 1977). The remainder of the twelve-channel capacity is used for the transmission of automated services, such as the UPI news and the stock exchange wire service.
Otherwise, less than 75 channel-hours of programming per month is originated from the
local cable company's studios, much of which is the programming of a national religious
group and live unedited transmissions of the local city council's meetings, transmitted free
.pursuant to the FCC's access rules. There is some two-way service available and used by a
local community college. There are no "pay cable" services. Id. Compare the situation in
Tulsa, Oklahoma. Its cable service has a 36-channel capacity, 24 of which are in use, four
of which retransmit local signals and two of which are imports. Other channels are devoted
to the origination of movies and children's programs, to various news services, to "access"
programming and to automated services. Tim CoMMrrEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 27, at 67.
46. See generally Shapiro, Epstein & Cass, Cable-Satellite Networks: Structures and
Problems, 24 CA'rH. U.L. REV. 692 (1975).
47. Cable systems can originate programming. In fact, for certain systems, a significant
cablecasting requirement was imposed by the FCC on cable operators. 47 C.F.R. §74.111(a)
(1972) (repealed 39 Fed. Reg. 43,302 (1974)). But one reason that networks-in contrast to
unaffiliated local broadcasters -have been able to provide highly attractive programming
has been their national revenue base. In 1960, the cost of producing a season of television
episodes was about $1.74 million. In that year, a local broadcaster would have been willing
to pay between $1,500 and $13,650 for the same number of episodes, bought in syndication
for his local market. B. OWEN, supra note 30, at 42-43. Meanwhile, cable operators have
argued that free access to broadcast signals for retransmission purposes, unhampered by
copyright liability, is a necessity if cable systems are to generate profits and amass the capital
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Beyond these economic limitations, the cable television industry has also
faced political obstacles to its development. To the broadcast stations and
the networks, the "promise" of cable television has been tantamount to the
threat of competition in markets where for several decades broadcasters have
enjoyed dominant, if not exclusive, positions.4s In several contexts, the FCC
has viewed cable's competition as potentially detrimental to the national
broadcast system.4 9 The FCC's response to the possible negative effects of
cable television's growth has been regulation that many claim has impaired
the growth of cable and denied viewers a more salutary selection of television
services 50
POLICY THEMES IN THE

FCC's

REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION

A primary purpose in the FCC's regulation of cable has been protection
of the existing system of television services. This policy theme is exemplified
by the FCC's statements which accompanied the announcement of the broadcast carriage rules, where the FCC said that a major objective of the rules
was to:
insure at least a minimum of service in underserved areas, set limits
to the impact of cable distant signal carriage on over-the-air broadcasting, and eliminate certain elements of competitive unfairness resulting from the fact that cable systems are not required under existing copyright laws to pay for the television broadcast programming
they pick up and distribute[,] . . . [and] (to promote service) attuned

to the needs and interests of the cable community. 51

necessary to invest in the equipment to provide the more advanced cable services. See SLOAN
COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 213.
48. A primary contention of broadcasters has been that cable, by using distant signals
without having to pay copyright royalties, produces unfair competition for local broadcasters. The broadcaster's fear has been that viewers faced with a wider choice of programming will be more sparsely divided among the available channels. This phenomenon, which
has been called audience fracture, would threaten advertising revenues for the local broadcaster, perhaps causing the marginal ones to go under, and decreasing profits for others.
See Lapierre, supra note 18, at 35-58. See generally Hearings Before the House Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary
on H.R. 2223, Copyright Law Review, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Another potential point
of competition between the broadcast and cable industries is in program supply markets.
It is acknowledged that viewers will pay far more to watch a television program than
advertisers will pay to show it to them. Consequently, pay cable because it has greater
revenue-raising capabilities, might be able to siphon programming currently shown on
networks, even though pay cable may ultimately show the program to a smaller audience.
See Hoffer, The Power of the FCC to Regulate Cable Pay-TV: Jurisdictional and Constitutional Limitations, 53 DEN. L.J. 477, 481 (1976); Horowitz, Pay TV and Sports Siphoning,
in Inquiry into Professional Sports: Final Report of the Select Committee on Professional
Sports, (House Report No. 94-1786) 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977); Analysis of Consumer Demand, supra note 28. See also Kahn, supra note 18; Pearson, Cable: The Thread by Which
Television Competition Hangs, 27 RurGERS L. REV. 800 (1974).
49. Compare note 48 supra with authorities cited in notes 51-53 infra.
50. See Price, Requiem for the Wired Nation: Cable Rulemaking at the FCC, 61 VA. L.
Rav. 541 (1975).
51. Cable Television Report and Order, In re Amendment Relative to CATV, 36
F.C.C. 2d 143, 149-50 (1972).
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The anti-competitive pay cable rules, 52 advanced by the FCC in order to
save "free" television, 53 are a significant variant on this same protectionist
policy goal.5
Another important policy theme in the FCC's regulation of cable has
been to treat cable operators as if they were broadcasters, charging them
with affirmative burdens that it believes will further the public interest in
first amendment values. 55 For instance, in announcing the "access rules,"5 86
which require cable operators to furnish transmission opportunities to various
groups, the FCC asserted that: ". . it is . . . appropriate that the fundamental goals of a national communications structure be furthered by cable the opening of new outlets for local expression, the promotion of diversity
in television programming, [and] the advancement of educational and instructional television, and increased informational services of local governments." 57 The application of the "fairness" doctrine and "equal time" rules 58
to cablecasting was grounded on a similar statement of FCC objectives. 59
"Localism" is another example of a policy developed under the framework
of the FCC's regulation of broadcasters, which has been adapted to the cable
television context. 60 Localism was especially evident as a consideration underlying the recently repealed "leapfrogging" rules,61 which required that cable
62
systems import certain signals from the nearest regional source.
52.

47 C.F.R. §76.225 (1976).

53. See Memorandum, Opinion and Order, In re Amendment to Rules and Regs. Relative
to CATV, 2& F.C.C. 2d 825, 826 (1970).
54. See Hoffer, The Power of the FCC to Regulate Cable Pay-TV: Jurisdictional and
Constitutional Limitations, 53 DEN. L.J. 477, 477-81 (1976). See also Brown, The Subscription Television Controversy: A Continuing Symptom of Federal Communication Commission
Ills, 24 FED. Com. B.J. 259 (1970-1971); Rappaport, The Emergence of Subscription Cable
Television and Its Role in Communications, 29 FED. COM. B.J. 301 (1976).
55. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. See generally Barrow, Program Regulation in Cable TV:
Fostering Debate in a Cohesive Audience, 61 VA. L. RE'v. 515 (1975); Hagelin, First Amendment Stake in the New Technology: The Broadcast Cable Controversy, 44 U. GIN. L. Riv.
427 (1975); Note, Cable Television and Content Regulation: The FCC, the First Amendment, and the Electronic Newspaper, 51 N.Y.U.L. RPv. 133 (1976).

56. 47 C.F.R. §§76.252-.258 (1977).
57. Cable Television Report and Order, In re Amendment Relative to CATV, 36 F.C.C.
2d 143, 190 (1972).
58. 47 C.F.R. §76.209 (1976).
59. First Report and Order, In re Amendment to Rules and Regs. Relative to CATV,
20 F.C.C. 2d 201, 223-25 (1969).
60. See Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959) (discussing 1952 Television Station Allocation Plan). See also Bendix Aviation Corp. v. United
States, 272 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 965 (1960).
61. 47 C.F.R. §76.59(6)(b) (1975), revised, 41 Fed. Reg. 3860, 3868 (1976) on grounds
that rules were burdensome on cable operators and did not serve the public interest, rejecting inter alia arguments that the rule promoted the public's "opportunity to receive...
programming responsive to community needs and interests." Id. at 3864.
62. Cable Television Report and Order, In re Amendment Relative to CATV, 36
F.C.C. 2d 143, 179 (1972). The Commission made the following remarks in announcing
the broadcast carriage rules: "Clearly, cable service can provide greater diversity -can, if
permitted. provide the full television complement of a New York or a Los Angeles to all
areas of the country. Although that would be a desirable achievement, it would pose a
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But the present cable regulations should not be viewed simply as acts
of FCC protectionism or as analogs of long-standing policies toward broadcasters. Nor is it necessarily appropriate that these be the guidelines of cable
regulation. Cable is, after all, a medium different from broadcasting, prospectively offering new types of services. The unique attributes of cable such
as its ability to make available more channels, its two-way services capabilities,
its closed circuit nature, its revenue base of subscriber fees, and the inevitable
interest of local governments, might compel consideration of a broader set
63
of factors in policy-making.
To some extent, the FCC has recognized the unique characteristics of
cable television and has sought to take a promotional, if qualified, policy
stance towards cable development. For instance, in resolving the problem of
cable's detrimental impact on local broadcasters, 6 4 the FCC decided to take
a pragmatic approach with the "basic objective . . . to get cable moving so
that the public may receive its benefits ... ."65 But the measure of this promotional position has been the extent to which cable growth can be achieved
"without jeopardizing the basic structure of over-the-air television."66 Accordingly, the Commission has treated cable systems as supplemental - that is,
useful for filling in the geographic and performance shortcomings of the
broadcast structure - but detrimental to the overall system insofar as its
services might overlap and compete with those historically supplied by broadcasters. 67 In short, the FCC's model for regulation of the television service
industry has not been premised on dynamic competition.Moreover, the FCC's techniques for obtaining the benefits of cable telethreat to broadcast television's service. We believe, however, that those who are not
accommodated as are New York or Los Angeles viewers should be entitled to the degree
of choice that will afford them a substantial amount of diversity and the public services
rendered by local stations." Id. at 177.
63. See generally Cable Performance Staff Report, supra note 29; P. MAcAvoY, supra
note 19; SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 35; Gerlach, Toward the Wired Society: Prospects,
Problems, and Proposals for a National Policy on Cable Technology, 25 MAINF L. REv.
193 (1973); Note, Proposed Cable Communications Act of 1975: A Recommendation for
Comprehensive Regulation, 1975 DuKE L.J. 93 (1975).
64. Cable's detrimental impact is alleged on the basis of the theory of audience "fracture." That phenomenon in theory is attributable to cable's importation of distant signals
which will compete for audiences with the signals of local broadcasters, threatening their
revenues from advertising.
65. Cable Television Report and Order, In re Amendment Relative to CATV, 36 F.C.C.
2d 143, 164 (1972). See generally First Report and Order, In re Amendments to Adopt Rules
and Regs. for Microwave Stations, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965).
66. Cable Television Report and Order, In re Amendment Relative to CATV, 36
F.C.C. 2d 143, 164 (1972).
67. See Cable Television Proposals, 31 F.C.C. 2d 115, 115 (1971); Memorandum Opinion
and Order, In re Amendment to Rules and Regs. Relative to CATV, 23 F.C.C. 2d 825, 826
(1970); Fourth Report and Order, In re Amendment to Provide for Subscription Television
Service, 15 F.C.C. 2d 466, 484 (1968); First Report and Order, In re Amendments to Adopt
Rules and Regs. for Microwave Stations, 38 F.C.C. 683, 689 (1965).
68. See generally Besen, Economic Policy Research on Cable Television: Assessing the
Costs and Benefits of Cable Deregulation, in P. MACAVOY, supra note 19 (discussing the
consequences of replacing regulatory with competitive constraints).
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vision have often emphasized the imposition of affirmative duties.69 These
affirmative requirements have been based on the Commission's vision of "a
future for cable in which the principal services, channel uses, and potential
sources of income will be from other than over-the-air signals."70 Yet, at the
same time, the FCC has been somewhat insensitive to the economic burdens

and inhibitory effects on service expansion that have been associated with
these requirements.7 1
Although the local monopoly of most cable systems may justify regulation designed to improve cable operators' performance, and may include obligations to perform affirmative duties, local government may stand in a
better position than the FCC to assess the needs of the local community.72
Indeed, that position of flexibility and sensitivity seems more compelling than
the FCC's rationale for its affirmative regulations: because "[b]roadcast signals
are being used as a basic component in the establishment of cable systems, ....
it is therefore appropriate that the fundamental goals of a national communications structure be furthered by cable ... ."7 Local government's proximity to local concerns also seems more compelling than the FCC's rationale
that local regulation might be confusing for its preemption of local authority.74
Because regulation by local government is "inescapable,"75 because
Congress has never delegated to the FCC authority to regulate cable television,
and because Congress certainly has not prescribed any policy goals for the
FCC's cable regulation76 the FCC's displacement of local authority seems especially presumptuous. The impropriety of that presumptuousness would
appear to be exacerbated by the FCC's disregard of the traditional American
preference for free enterprise and competition, and of the fundamental administrative law principle that administrative agencies may exercise only
so much authority as is properly delegated to them. 7
TEE SuPp mmCotUT's

INTERPRETATION OF THE CoMzuNIcATioNs ACT

The FCC was established by the Communications Act of 1934.78 The
scope of its authority under the 1934 Act has traditionally been interpreted
69. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§76.252-.258 (1977) (access rules).
70. Cable Television Report and Order, In re Amendment Relative to CATV, 36 F.C.C.
2d 143, 190 (1972).
71. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Amendment to Rules and Regs. Relative to CATV, 23 F.C.C. 2d 825, 826 (1970) (rejecting argument of cable operators that
mandatory origination was economically burdensome).
72. LeDuc, Control of Cable Television: The Senseless Assault on States' Rights, 24 CATH.
U.L. RPv. 795 (1975).
73. Cable Television Report and Order, In re Amendment Relative to CATV, 36 F.C.C.

2d 143, 190 (1972).
74. Id. at 193-207 (1972). See generally 47 C.F.R. §76.31 (1975) (describing federalstate/local relationships); Note, Cable Television in Illinois: The Problems of Concurrent
Jurisdiction,50 Cm.-KENT L. RiEv. 119 (1973).
75. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C. 2d 143, 207 (1972).
76. See note 11 supra.
77. American Power & Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 112 (1946); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414,424 (1944).
78. 47 U.S.C. § §151-609 (1970).
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broadly to allow the agency to cope with new developments in the communications media.7 9 Since the Act was passed long before the advent of cable
television,80 however, and because by its terms the Act is specifically applicable
only to common carriers and broadcasters, 8' the agency was initially reluctant to extend its regulation to cable television.8 2 By 1962, however, the
FCC had taken some preliminary measures in the regulation of cable. 83 Yet it
was primarily after 1968, after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co.,

4

that the FCC embarked on the ambitious course

of regulation that its rules have reflected. 85 Thus the Southwestern decision,
which upheld an FCC order prohibiting a cable company from expanding its

79. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943); F.C.C. v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940); Buckeye Cablevision, Inc. v. F.C.C.,
387 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (upholding FCC's regulation of cable).
80. The first cable television system appears to have been constructed in 1948 in Mahoney City, Pennsylvania. PHILLIPS, CATV: A HISTORY OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION
8-10 (1972).
81. Subchapter I of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§151-155 (1970) is
entitled "General Provisions"; Subchapter II, 47 U.S.C. §§201-223 (1970) is entitled "Common
Carriers"; Subchapter III, 47 U.S.C. §§301-330 (1970) is entitled "Special Provisions Relating to Radio." Because radio communication is defined to include transmission by
pictures, the Act has been held to cover television. 47 U.S.C. §153(b) (1970); Allen B. Bumont
Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951).
82. See Frontier Broadcasting v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958).
83. The FCC in 1962 placed restrictions on the use of microwave transmissions which
cable television systems used to communicate signals over long distances. Carter Mountain
Transmission, 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), ahf'd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963). In 1966, the FCC
asserted jurisdiction over cable systems proper and issued the forerunners of the current
broadcast carriage and non-duplication rules. Second Report and Order, In re Amendment
to Govern the Grant of Authorizations for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals
to CATV, 2 F.C.C. 2d 725 (1966). At that time, the FCC based its jurisdiction over cable
on the plain language of §§1, 2, 3(a) and 3(b) of the Communications Act. Id. at 793 app.
The Commission rejected arguments that it did not have jurisdiction because there was
no Communications Act provision granting authority or because the Commission had
previously denied its authority. Id. at 729. The Commission countered the contention that
§2(b) of the Communications Act, prohibiting FCC regulation of intrastate common carriers,
precluded FCC regulation of cable television. Cable television, it said, was not a common
carrier, and furthermore, carried interstate broadcast signals. Id. at 729-31. Specific grounds
for the regulations issued were said to lie in several sections of the Communications Act's
Subchapter III, which authorized the FCC to develop a television assignment plan. Id. at
794 app.
84. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
85. See generally Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, In re Amendment of Rules and Regs. Relative to CATV, 15 F.C.C. 2d 417 (1968). The Supreme Court
decided that same year that cable television systems were not liable in copyright for their
retransmissions of broadcast signals. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
In Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, In re Amendment of Rules and
Regs. Relative to CATV, 15 F.C.C. 2d at 434-35, the Commission indicated that the
reason for its expanded regulation was protection of UHF broadcast stations from cable's
"unfair competition." The Commission relied on Southwestern as having granted it jurisdiction over cable. Id. at 434.
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service into a major broadcasting market,8 9 has been viewed as granting after
87
the fact the authority which Congress had not previously granted
An understanding of the Southwestern holding requires an examination of
the methodology used by the late Justice Harlan, who wrote for six members
of the Court.s s His opinion began by noting that the Communications Act
set out the FCC's responsibilities in its Section 15189 and that the scope of the
Act was described in Section 152(a).9 0 Southwestern Cable, the appellee, had
principally argued that Section 152(a) did not independently grant regulatory
authority to the FCC; rather, this section of the Act only limited the types
of communications to which Subchapter II (pertaining to common carriers)
and Subchapter III (pertaining to radio) otherwise applied.91 Harlan refuted
that contention, but never expressly stated that Section 152(a) amounted to a
delegation of authority. Instead he ambiguously remarked that there was "no
reason to believe that Section 152 does not, as its terms suggest, confer regulatory authority over 'all interstate.., communication by, wire or radio.' "92
Harlan then found that under Sections 303(f) and (h), which are in the
Act's Subchapter III, Congress had given the FCC the power to prevent
channel interference and to establish and allocate broadcast zones. Additionally,
he found that under Section 307(b), the FCC had the responsibility to assure
efficient and equitable service.9 3 Harlan found reasonable the FCC's determination that the detrimental impact on broadcasters of Southwestern's activities might jeopardize the achievement of those goals. Consequently, the Court

86. In re Midwest Television, Inc., 13 F.C.C. 2d 478 (1968). Southwestern Cable Co.
was carrying the signals of Los Angeles stations into the San Diego area. The FCC had
prohibited by rule such extensions of broadcast signals unless the cable company demonstrated that it would be consistent with the establishment and maintenance of broadcast
service in the area. On petition for relief under the rule by a broadcaster with stations ii
both San Diego and Los Angeles, the FCC prohibited Southwestern from further expanding
its service. The Ninth Circuit had reversed the FCC's decision on the grounds that the
Commission was without authority to issue the order under the Communications Act.
87. Cable Performance Staff Report, supra note 29, at 27-28.
88. Justice Douglas and Mars
did not participate. Justice White concurred in the
result, arguing that the Cotimission's sttutory power to prevent interference between
broadcasters was sufficient to support the order. He said that the FCC must base its jurisdiction generally on prcvisions
of the Communications Act other than §152(a). 392 U.S. at 181-82
/

(White, J., concurring).
89. 392 U.S. t 167. Section 151 states that the FCC was created "[f]or the purpose of
regulating . . . cfmmunication by wire and radio so as to make available

.

.

.

a rapid.

efficient, nation- ide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service ....
The
statute also sta es other purposes for which the FCC was established. 47 U.S.C. §151 (1970).
90. 392 .S. at 167. Section 152(a) states: "The provisions of this Act shall apply to
all intersta and foreign communication by wire or radio . . . and to all'persons engaged
within the United States in such communication or such transmission of energy by radio,
and to th licensing and regulating of all radio stations .... " 47 U.S.C.§152(a) (1970).
91. 192 U.S. at 171-72. Respondents also emphasized that the FCC itself had thought
its aut ority unfounded, citing the two instances when it had gone to Congress for
enabli#g legislation. Id. at 169-71.
9I. id. at 173.

3. Id. at 174.
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sustained the FCC's power to promulgate the order.94 Nevertheless, Harlan
emphasized the narrowness of the Court's holding:
There is no need here to determine in detail the limits of the Commission's authority to regulate CATV. It is enough to emphasize that
the authority which we recognize . . . is restricted to that reasonably
ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting. . . . We
express no views as to the Commission's authority, if any, to regulate
95
CATV under any other circumstances or for any other purposes.
Courts have since focused on the words "reasonably ancillary" as providing, in some degree, a distillation of the Southwestern opinion. 96 It is, in fact,
tempting to read Southwestern as saying simply that the FCC has authority
over cable television insofar as its regulations are "reasonably ancillary to
the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the
regulation of television broadcasting." When the Supreme Court next
examined FCC regulation of cable, in United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,97
the plurality essentially adopted that view.99 But a much narrower reading is
clearly possible and probably more consistent with Harlan's overall approach
in Southwestern.
Harlan's methodology indicates that the initial inquiry in determining
the legality of FCC rules should consider whether the transmission activity in
question is one which the Communications Act was intended to reach. 99 Subsequently, a court, given the fact that cable television systems are not specifically
included in the Act, would consider the reasonableness of allowing the FCC
to regulate the cable systems in the specific manner contemplated. The legality
of the FCC's regulation in any given instance might turn on the relationship
of the cable activity regulated to the FCC's responsibilities as set out under
the Act.
The Southwestern Court, one might argue, found that it could treat the
problem posed by Southwestern Cable's importation of distant broadcasts to
the detriment of local broadcasters as one involving essentially the transmission and use of broadcast signals. Harlan's focus, therefore was at least initially
on the nature of the activity and not on the actors or on the activity's effect.
It was not necessary in order to sustain the FCC action that Section 152(a)
confer jurisdiction over cable systems so long as the Act conferred jurisdiction
over the use of broadcast signals. For Harlan and the Southwestern Court,
the need for the "reasonably ancillary" standard arose only to settle whether
the FCC had the power to compel a non-broadcaster, non-common carrier to
94. Id. at 175-77.
95. Id. at 178.
96.

See cases cited at note 24 supra.

97. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
98. Id. at 650-51, 662-63.
99. For evidence of that intent, one would look primarily to §152. Interstate communications, whether by wire or radio would be subject to regulation. 47 U.S.C. §152(a) (1970).
Cf. 47 U.S.C. §152(b)(3) (1970) (prohibiting FCC jurisdiction over "carriers" engaged in
interstate communication "solely through connection by radio, or by wire and radio.')
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comply with the FCC's statutory goals.10 0 Recognizing that Southwestern and
other cable companies were functionally traffickers in broadcast signals - or,
as Chief Justice Burger would later say, "not exactly strangers to the stream
of broadcasting"'101 - the Court was satisfied that the test had been met, that
the burden on cable systems was reasonable. The regulation only went so far
as to regulate broadcast traffic. 02
By 1972, when the Supreme Court decided the case of United States v.
Midwest Video,03 the FCC had expanded 0 4 the scope of its cable television
regulation to include a "mandatory origination" requirement. 0 5 Under that
rule, certain cable companies were required to transmit, or "cablecast," programs to their subscribers.' The cable companies were to function as new
outlets for program material by making available programming beyond the
basic offering of retransmitted broadcast signals. 10 7 Because the "mandatory
origination" rule did not directly involve broadcast signals at all, it presented
for the Supreme Court a test of the FCC's authority much different than
the order challenged in Southwestern Cable.
The Court nevertheless again affirmed the FCC's regulation, albeit without
a majority opinion. Justice Brennan, writing for the four-member plurality, 08
began by reading Southwestern to have held that Section 152(a) of the
Communications Act granted the FCC regulatory authority over cable television.1 9 He continued:
This conclusion ... did not end the analysis, for [§152(a)] does not in
and of itself prescribe any objectives for which the Commission's regula100. Section 152(a) says that the provisions of the chapter apply to persons engaged in
interstate communication "by radio." 4'7 U.S.C. §152(a) (1970).
101. 406 U.S. at 676 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
102. Cf., Cable Performance Staff Report, supra note 29, at 28: "[S]ince the Commission
had argued for jurisdiction only because of impact upon conventional broadcasting the
Court limited its holding to that ground."
103. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).

104. See generally Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Amendment to Rules and
Regs. Relative to CATV, 23 F.C.C. 2d 825 (1970); First Report and Order, In re Amendment to Rules and Regs. Relative to CATV, 20 F.C.C. 2d 201 (1969).
105. 47 C.F.R. §74.1111(a) (1972) (amended, 39 Fed. Reg. 43,302 (1974)).
106. The rule required that "no CATV system having 3,500 or more subscribers sball
carry the signal of any television broadcast station unless the system also operated to a
significant extent as a local outlet by cablecasting and has available facilities for local
production and presentation of programs ..
" 47 C.F.R. §74.1111(a) (1972) (repealed 39
Fed. Reg. 43,302 (1974)). Cable companies were opposed to the requirements primarily
because of its economic burden. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Amendment
to Rules and Regs. Relative to CATV, 23 F.C.C. 2d 825, 826 (1970). The burden of the
rule was contingent on cable system's use of broadcast signals. First Report and Order, In re
Amendment to Rules and Regs. Relative to CATV, 20 F.C.C. 2d 201 (1969); Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, In re Amendment of Rules and Regs, Relative
to CATV, 15 F.C.C. 2d 417, 422 (1968).

107. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, In re Amendment of
Rules and Regs. Relative to CATV, 15 F.C.C. 2d 417, 421 (1968).
108. Brennan, J., was joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ. Burger, C.J., concurred in the result. See text accompanying notes 121-127 infra.
109. 406 U.S. at 660.
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tory power over CATV might properly be exercised. We accordingly
went on to evaluate the reasons for which the Commission had asserted
jurisdiction and found that the Commission has reasonably concluded
that regulatory authority over CATV is imperative if it is to perform
with appropriate effectiveness certain of its other responsibilities." 0
In effect, Brennan abandoned the Southwestern analysis, which had suggested
that the FCC look to the Communications Act for a jurisdictional basis over
each regulated cable function or activity. Justice Brennan's primary concern
appeared to be whether the FCC's objectives in the regulation were sound,
and only in passing did Brennan note that the origination rule "serve[s] the
policies of §§1 and 303(g)."' As he formulated the test, the legality of the
FCC's cable jurisdiction depended on whether the Commission had determined
that the action taken would "further the achievement of long-established
regulatory goals in the field of television broadcasting.""? Cable could be
governed "with a view not merely to protect but to promote the objectives
for which the Commission had been assigned jurisdiction over broadcasting.""' In other words, the mandatory origination rule could be wholly
supported by the fact that the FCC had an existing policy of increasing the
outlets for community expression and the diversity of television programs
4
and services."
Justice Douglas wrote the Midwest Video dissent, which, like Brennan's
plurality opinion, represented the views of four members of the Court."'
The dissent's basic proposition was that the FCC had no authority to promulgate the mandatory origination rule absent Congressional authority." 6 Thus
the opinion directly challenged Brennan's assertion that Section 152(a) was
jurisdictional and that the Southwestern Court had held it to be so." 7 Un110. Id.at 661.
Ill. Id. at 669. Brennan said of the origination rule: "In essence the regulation is no
different from Commission rules governing the technological quality of CATV broadcast
carriage. In the one case, of course, the concern is with the strength of the picture and
the voice received by the subscriber, while in the other, it is with the content of the
programming offered. But in both cases the rules serve the policies of §§[151] and 303(g)
....
In sum, the regulation preserves and enhances the integrity of broadcast signals and
therefore is reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various
responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting." Id. at 669-70.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 667.
114. Id. at 667-68. A further question addressed by the plurality was whether the rule
was supported by substantial evidence. The respondent had argued, and the lower court
had agreed that, because the economic burden of the rule stifled the growth of cable, it
was contrary to the public interest. The plurality, however, was satisfied that the Commission had made sufficient effort "to tailor the regulation to the financial capacity of CATV
operators," noting that it was "beyond the competence of the Court of Appeals . . . to
assess the relative risks and benefits of cablecasting." Id. at 672-74. For an example of
subsequent lower courts' treatment of evidentiary issues in the context of the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction over cable, see Home Box Office v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9 (1977).
115. Douglas, J., was joined by Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ. 406 U.S. at 677.
116. Id.
117. Douglas interpreted Southwestern as saying only that the Communications Act
under §152(a) "was not limited to the precise methods of communication" known when
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fortunately, Douglas' opinion did not stop there. If it had, the inference
might readily be drawn that the dissent had applied the Southwestern Court's'
analysis and found no statutory basis for the origination rule.""" Douglas
went on, however, to distinguish the order affirmed in Southwestern Cable
from the rule under consideration in Midwest Video, primarily on the
grounds that the latter required that cable operators engage in affirmative
acts and expenditures. Such affirmative acts and expenditures, he said, could
not be required of broadcasters and thus, could not be imposed on cable
companies. 1 9
Douglas' distinction between the two cases on the basis of their economic
burden seems to go only to the issue of whether a regulation is reasonable,
but does little to clarify what is ancillary. To this end, Douglas might have
emphasized the functional differences between the activities which the FCC
had regulated in the two cases. While Southwestern directly involved cable
transmission of broadcast signals, Midwest Video involved activities that did
not use broadcast signals at all. One suspects that Douglas intended to make
this distinction, although his choice of language is ambiguous. 20
Chief Justice Burger's decisive concurrence is highly significant in terms
of Midwest Video's precedential value, but his opinion is the least susceptible
of clear interpretation. Although the Chief Justice acknowledged. that the
mandatory origination rule "strains the outer limits". of the Commission's
legal jurisdiction,'2' his treatment of the-Commission's powers at times -appears
broader than that of- the plurality.- He remarked that, although Congress
could not have had any intent in the 1934 Act with regard to cable television,,
"that statutory scheme plainly anticipated the need for, comprehensive 'regulation as pervasive as the reach of the instrumentalities of broadcasting.122 Un
predictable scientific advances, he said, require that "regulatory schemes
12
must be flexible and virtually open-ended."'
the Communications Act was passed. Id. Compare that interpretation with the plurality
view, id. at 659-61, and United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 173.'
118. See generally 406 U.S. at 649, 679-81 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas used
specific provisions of the Act primarily to advance his argument that the FCC cannot compel
cable operators, to become broadcasters or to perform the functions of broadcasters. This
position refuted the plurality's assertion that cable companies can be regulated as long
as its regulation is consistent with the FCC's responsibilities for broadcasting regulation.
Douglas iaw the "mandatory originatioi" rule as forcing cable operators, otherwise 'no
more than "carriers," into becoming a broadcaster while broadcasters' themselves live under
more lenient rules. Id. at 680. He said that §303(g) "relates to the objectives of the Act"
and was not jurisdictional. Id. at 681.
119. Id. at 678.
120. Douglas, for example, stated that in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television,
392 U.S. 390 (1968), the Supreme Court "made clear how foreign the origiiation of 'pr6grams is to CATV's traditional transmission of signals." 406 U.S. at 678. Later he asserted"Of course, the Commission can regulate a CATV that transmits broadcast signals. But to
entrust the Commission with the power to force some, a few, or all CATV operators into the
broadcast business is to give it a forbidding authority." Id. at 681 (Douglas J.,
dissenting).
121. 406 U.S. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring in result).
122. Id. at 675.
123.

Id. at 674-75.

"'

.

.
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The most appropriate interpretation of Burger's opinion may be that he
viewed the FCC as having a broad jurisdiction over cable television, but one
that is defeasible in the face of certain conditions. He noted, for instance,
that cable television "is dependent totally on broadcast signals and is a significant link in the system as a whole and therefore must be seen as within
the jurisdiction of the Act.' 24 Later he said that the "essence of the matter
is that when [cable operators] interrupt the broadcast signals and put it in
their own use for profit, they take on burdens, one of which is regulation by
the Commission."' 125 He concluded that "until Congress acts, the Commission
should be allowed wide latitude.' 2 Each of these statements includes a factual
premise that is susceptible to change. Burger's statement that the FCC mandatory origination rule "strains the outer limits of its authority" implies that
changes in the primary activity of cable operators, or some expression of intent
1 27
by Congress with respect to cable, might reverse Burger's vote.
RECENT CIcurr CouRTs OF APPEALS DECISIONS

A narrow interpretation of the Southwestern Cable opinion might restrict
the FCC's authority over the cable television to activities in which cable
directly makes use of broadcast signals.12 Presumably, that view was preserved by the Midwest Video dissent.1 29 In contrast, a synthesis of the opinions
by Brennan and Burger in Midwest Video would support the proposition
that, as long as cable systems retransmit broadcast signals and "until Congress
acts," the FCC may regulate cable television consistently with goals that have
been developed in the FCC's experience with the regulation of broadcasting. 30 The latter view, given the facts of Midwest Video, would appear to
allow the FCC to consider the overall impact of cable television on the
national communications systems in drafting cable regulations.:"'
In at least three circuit court of appeals cases that have reviewed the
FCC's cable rulemaking since Midwest Video,132 the FCC has asserted that
124. Id. at 675.
125. Id. at 676.
126. Id.
127. See text accompanying notes 214-222 infra.
128. See text accompanying notes 96-102 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 115-120 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 108-114 and 125-128 supra.
131. The open-endedness of the "ancillary jurisdiction" doctrine under Midwest Video
has been acknowledged and cited as a reason for enacting cable legislation at this time.
Cable Performance Staff Report, supra note 29, at 28-29.
132. Midwest Video Corp. v. F.C.C., 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978); Home Box Office,
Inc. v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, U.S. -,
98 S.Ct. 111 (1977);
Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. F.C.C., 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976). A
fourth case reviewing the FCC's cable rulemaking involved no challenge to the FCC's
jurisdiction over cable. Rather, petitioner ACLU sought a further rulemaking. It wanted the
FCC to impose common carrier obligations on cable systems and to limit cable operators
to cablecasting on one channel. The petition was denied on the ground that the FCC's
refusal to issue such orders was not inconsistent with actions "reasonably ancillary to the
effective performance of [its] various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting." A.C.L.U. v. F.C.C., 525 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975). A fifth case has recently been
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Southwestern Cable-Midwest Video vested it with broad regulatory powers
over the cable industry. 33 Each of those courts, however, has rejected that
argument and has refused to recognize an unlimited grant of cable jurisdiction. Moreover, each has invalidated some portion of the FCC's cable rules.13
The first two of these cases were heard and decided in the District of
Columbia Circuit. In National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC (hereinafter NARUG),135 the petitioner challenged the FCC's
preemption of state regulation of two-way, point-to-point, non-video communication.The state utilities commissioners saw this cable television
service as similar to, and competitive with, services offered by intrastate
common carriers1 37 whose regulation had been expressly reserved to the states
under Section 2(b) of the Communications Act. 38 In contrast, the FCC's
rationale for the preemption of state regulation was that optimum development of cable could only be achieved where the cable technology was treated
as an organic whole for regulation purposes.3 9 That argument led necessarily
to the FCC's ambitious proposition that the FCC, under Southwestern Cable
and Midwest Video, had blanket jurisdiction over the cable television in40
dustry.
Judge Wilkey, writing for the majority, rejected the proposition specifically
asserted by Justice Brennan in Midwest Video that Section 152(a) was "unambiguously jurisdictional."'4' Explaining the precedential value of Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video, he argued:
.[Thel Court's reasoning . . .compels the conclusion that the cable
jurisdiction, which they have located primarily in §152(a), is really
incidental to and contingent upon, specifically delegated powers under
decided in the second circuit. Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelley, 573 F.2d 765 (2d Cir.
1978). That court distinguished the prior circuit cases and upheld the FCC's preemption
of local and state regulation of pay-cable rates. See text accompanying notes 197-205 infra.
133. Midwest Video Corp. v. F.C.C., 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978); Home Box Office v.
F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. F.C.C., 533 F.2d

601, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
134. Midwest Video Corp. v. F.C.C., 571 F.2d 1025, 1038-39 (8th Cir. 1978); Home Box
Office v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs
v. F.C.C., 533 F.2d 601, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
135. 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
136. The preemption of state authority in this area was announced in 1972. Cable
Television Report and Order, In re Amendment Relative to CATV, 36 F.C.C. 2d 143, 193.
See also Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Advisability of Federal Preemption of
CATV Technical Standards, 49 F.C.C. 2d 1078, 1081 (1974); Clarification of the Cable
Television Rules, In re Advisability of Federal Preemption of CATV Technical Standards,
46 F.C.C. 2d 175, 185-86.
137. 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Natl Ass'n of Regulatory Util Comm'rs,
525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
138. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs. v. F.C.C., 533 F.2d 601, 610 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). Cf. T.V. Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), aff'd, 396 U.S. 556

(1970) (states may regulate cable systems as public utilities if regulation does not interfere
with federal objectives).
139. 533 F.2d at 611.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 612.
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the Act. The statute's introductory section is made a locus for powers
which must of necessity be recognized if the purposes set out in the
broadcasting sections are to receive their fullest realization. The Court
thus was not recognizing any sweeping authority over the entity as a
whole, but was commanding that each and every assertion of jurisdiction over cable television must be independently justified as reasonably ancillary to the Commission's power over broadcasting.42
The Court's initial duty in testing a rule under the ancillary jurisdiction
test, according to the NARUC court, was to "weigh the statutory purposes
served by allowing . ..jurisdiction, against those which would thereby be
impaired. ' ' 1 43 The court found that Section 152(b),144 which precludes FCC
jurisdiction over intrastate common carrier activities, was a substantial bar
to the FCC's preemption of state regulation of a cable operator's intrastate
1 45
non-video, point-to-point services.
The Section 152(b) bar might have ended the analysis under Southwestern
Cable.146 Judge Wilkey, however, read Midwest Video as expanding the policy
considerations that might support agency action. The "ancillary to broadcasting" test, he said, might be satisfied by "any regulation of cable which
in its own right serves the purposes pursued by broadcast regulation.' ' 4 7
Nevertheless, Wilkey determined that no such purpose could be discovered and
substantiated. A policy to promote communications services might have been
sufficient, but the court found no evidence that state regulation would impair
the ability of cable systems to raise revenue to support public services.'" The
court also noted that there was a certain asymmetry in NARUC, which had
not been present in Midwest Video and which made the instant regulation
especially undesirable. In Midwest Video, the regulated cable activity competed with broadcast signals under the jurisdiction of the FCC; in NARUC,
competition with the cable activity arose from activities primarily under the
purview of state and local regulatory authorities. 49 Noting the Section 152(b)
bar and the absence of a significant statutory or broadcast purpose, the
NARUC court distinguished its factual situation from an "ideal test case."' 50
Home Box Office v. FCC,-' decided one year later in the same court,
142. Id.
143.

Id. at 607.

144.

47 U.S.C. §152(b) (1970).

145. Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util Comm'rs v. F.C.C., 533 F.2d at 607-11 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
146. But see 533 F.2d at 621-23 (Lumbard, Circuit Judge, concurring). Judge Lumbard
thought it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether §152(b) prohibited the preemption
of state authority, noting that if cable companies were common carriers, they had been
made so by a rule which the FCC would have no authority to promulgate. Id. at 621.
147. Id. at 615 (Wilkey, J., for the court).
148. Id. at 616.
149. Id.
150. Id. The ideal test case, according to Wilkey, would have presented two factors
missing in NARUC. First, the regulated activity would have involved entertainment programs that were in competition with broadcast audiences. Secondly, there would have been
no statutory bar. Id. at 616-17.
151. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1917).
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involved a challenge to the FCC's pay cable rules.1 52 Because it involved those
rules, it was not only a case much closer to the "ideal test case" Judge Wilkey
had alluded to in NARUC,2 53 but was also a case of far more controversy
154
At the heart
and consequence within the broadcast and cable industries.
of the pay cable controversy was the highly political question of who might
1 55
Further, the
control the most lucrative television entertainment events.
pay cable rules, which practically destroyed competition between the cable
and broadcast industry for the most desirable television programs, were
50
especially susceptible to "protectionist" and "agency capture" accusations.1
Yet, if the political propriety of the pay cable rules was questionable, so
was the legal basis for invalidating the rules. Unlike NARUC, the Home Box
Office court found no provision of the Communications Act that specifically
7
withdrew the subject matter of the rules from the FCC's jurisdiction.15
Furthermore, the "long-established regulatory goals developed in the field
of television broadcasting" which Judge Wilkey had found wanting in
59
NARUC,'5 were not ostensibly a problem for the FCC in Home Box Office.1

152. 47 C.F.R. §76.225 (1977).
153. See note 151 supra.
154. Some notion of the significance may be achieved by noting that Home Box Office
was a consolidation ot fifteen separate cases. Among the intervenors and briefs amicus curiae
were the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, the American Mothers Committee,
Inc., Professional Baseball, and Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. The Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice also filed a brief.
155. For many cable visionaries, the transformation of the television "wasteland" into
the "wired nation" has been deemed largely dependent on the future of pay cable.
Program diversity, programming for selective minority audiences, the elimination of
commercialism and improvement of the television industry's program production and distribution markets have each been held out as a potential benefit that might accrue if -pay
cable could become financially viable. See note 45 supra. That viability, it has been argued,
is dependent on pay cable promotors having access to the most desirable programs. Home
Box Office, Inc. v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1977). On the other hand, the potential
expansion and growth of pay cable has long been seen as a threat to the networks and
broadcasters. In turn, representatives of the broadcast industry have argued that pay
cable would destroy free television because of its tendency to divert or siphon the most
popular programs from the advertiser supported broadcast networks. In particular, poor
people and residents of rural areas, to whom it might never be economically feasible to
bring cable service, have been identified as the potential losers in the siphoning scenario.
Pay cable, in other words, has been characterized as essentially an anti-democratic, antiegalitarian phenomenon. See generally First Report and Order, in re Amendment to Rules
and Regs. Relative to CATV, 20 F.C.C. 2d 201 (1969); Fourth Report and Order, In re
Amendment Relating to the Distribution of Television Broadcast Signals by CATV, 15
F.C.C. 2d 466 (1968); First Report, In re Amendment to Provide for Subscription Television
Service, 23 F.C.C. 532 (1957).
156. See generally 567 F.2d at 51-52 (discussing "Ex Parte Contracts"). See also Note,
Ex Parte Contacts in Informal Rule-Making, 65 CALIF. L. RFv. 1315 (1977); Cable Television
Report and Order, In re Amendment Relative to CATV, 36 F.C.C. 2d 143, 311 (1972)
(Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
157. Compare 567 F.2d at 28-34 with 533 F.2d at 607-11.
158. 533 F.2d at 615.
159. But see Brief for Respondent at 30, Home Box Office, Inc. v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9
(D.C. Cir. 1977). The FCC, having argued that it had broad regulatory powers over cable,
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In fact, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals had already upheld
160
essentially the same rules as applied to subscription television.
Nevertheless, the Home Box Office court, in a per curiam opinion,161 held
that the pay cable rules were beyond the legitimate scope of the FCC's
authority.1

62

In

reaching its conclusion,

the court initially applied

the

"reasonably ancillary to the Commission's authority over broadcast television" standard as had been developed in the NARUC case as the result
6s
of a synthesis of the Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video opinions.'
The Home Box Office court interpreted Southwestern Cable-Midwest
Video as looking in "two directions." First, the Supreme Court looked
towards an "expansive jurisdiction" for the FCC, based on Section 152(a) of
the Communications Act. Yet the Home Box Office court found in those same
decisions a limitation on FCC jurisdiction: the FCC, in its regulation of cable,
could "act only for ends for which it could also regulate broadcast television."164 According to the court, the test was whether the Commission could "demonstrate specific support for its actions in the language of
the Communications Act or . . . ground them in a well-understood and
consistently held policy developed in the Commission's regulation of broadcast television."' 65 Applying the jurisdictional standards, the court then found
two possible grounds for sustaining the FCC's jurisdiction to issue the rules.
One ground was the statutory mandate of Section 151 of the Act' 66 to
insure a nation-wide system of communications. The court dismissed this
contention, finding that pay cable's purported threat to nationwide service,
based on the theory that certain rural areas would be deprived of service
by "siphoning," was no more than a naked allegation unsupported by the
record16t The court did find merit in the second argument, that the FCC had
did not attempt to clearly bring its anti-siphoning rules within the "long-established goals"
test.
160. Nat'l Ass'n of Theatre Owners (NATO) v. F.C.C., 420 F.2d 194 (1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970). See text accompanying notes 170-173 infra.
161. The court explained the "per curiam" designation in a footnote: "The opinion
in this case is issued as a per curiam, not because it has received less than full consideration by the court, but because the complexity of the issues raised on appeal made it useful
to share the effort required to draft this opinion among the members of the panel." 567
F,2d at 17 n.l. The court's division of labor suggests not only the "creative reading"
recommended in note 177 infra, but also that the Home Box Office inquiry entails an undesirably burdensome scope of review.
162. 567 F.2d at 28-30. The court also found independent evidentiary grounds and
first amendment grounds for its holding. Id. at 34-51. Further, the court rebuked the FCC
and other parties for their "ex parte contacts" but took no conclusive action on the
matter. Id. at 58. See generally Note, supra note 156. Finally, the court reaffirmed the
position it had taken with regard to the FCC's subscription television rules. 567 F.2d at
59-60.
163. 567 F.2d at 27.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 28.
166. 47 U.S.C. §151 (1970).
167. 567 F.2d at 25. The court's treatment of this issue demonstrates the substantial
evidentiary burden imposed by the ancillary jurisdiction requirement. The court said:
"[Thel Commission has nowhere spelled out even a theory of the dynamic which could
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a long-standing broadcast television policy to "maintain present levels of

public enjoyment" by regulation of program format. However, analogizing
the pay cable rules to compulsory format changes in license renewal proceedings, the court found that the FCC had been unwilling in the past to
compel such format changes. Such past reluctance estopped assertion of longstanding policy in the instant case.'s
This estoppel by analogy by the Home Box Office court seems flawed.
The court purported to evaluate the pay cable rules against the measure of
policy goals, but instead measured the rules against the means employed
by the FCC in pursuance of those goals. If that measure had been the test
under Midwest Video, the mandatory origination requirement upheld in
that case probably would have failed since the FCC has never required
broadcasters to originate programming on a separate channel. On the other
hand, the FCC had classified programming for broadcasters and required
certain types of program presentations at certain times,1 9 regulations as
closely analogous to the pay cable rules as compulsory format changes.
The court's analysis of this issue - whether the pay cable rules were
supported by established regulatory goals in the field of television broadcasting - turned entirely on the merits of the imperfect analogy drawn between
compulsory format changes and the pay cable rules. The shortcoming of the
court's analogical method becomes more evident when considered with its
limited discussion of NATO v. FCC,' 09 the case that upheld the subscription
television rules. 71 Those rules were based on the same broadcast policy goals
designed to prevent "siphoning" as were the pay cable rules. Additionally,
the subscription television rules employed practically identical means to
reach those goals - namely, rules precluding pay television from using the
most desirable entertainment programs that had typically been shown on

result in loss of broadcast television service to regions not served by cable. Nor is such a
dynamic readily apparent. For example, cablecasters are unlikely to withhold feature film
and sports material from markets they do not serve since broadcast of this material in such
markets could not reduce the potential cable audience .... In these circumstances, the
postulated loss of regional service is too speculative to support jurisdiction." Cf. United
States v. Midwest Video Corp. 406 U.S. 649, 676 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (arguing
that important reasons for upholding the FCC rule were the court's limited scope of review
and the FCC's expertise in regulatory problems in this area).
168. 567 F.2d at 28-82. The court discussed at length Citizens Committee to Save
WEFM v. F.C.C., 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974), where it had upheld the position of the
citizens' committee to have the FCC order a change in format. In the instant case, the FCC
relied on that D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals opinion to show that the FCC had authority
to order changes in program format to maintain present levels of public enjoyment. The
Home Box Office court, however, was unconvinced that the FCC had since given up the
position it had taken in WE.M. The court said: "If the Commission's own recently
announced standards are applied to the rules challenged here, it seems dear that the rules
cannot stand." 567 F.2d at 31.
169. 47 C.F.R. §73.658(k) (1976).
170. Nat'l Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. F.C.C., 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
897 U.S. 922 (1970), discussed in Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 82-34, 59-61.
171. Fourth Report and Order, In re Subscription Television, 15 F.C.C. 2d 466 (1968).
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"free" television. 72 Yet the court refused to reconcile its treatment of the pay
73
cable rules with this case.:1
While ignoring precedent apparently on point, the court proceeded to
explore new sources of limitation on the FCC's cable authority. In NARUC,
the court had said that the boundaries of the FCC's reasonably ancillary
jurisdiction could be found only by balancing the statutory goals and welldeveloped broadcast television goals tending to support the instant FCC rulemaking, against Communications Act policies to the contrary.17 4 The Home
Box Office court found no such competing provisions of the Communications
Act. Yet, much as the NARUC court had looked to the Communications Act
for indications that the FCC's jurisdiction over cable might be bounded by
established policy, the Home Box Office court sought out policy themes to
limit the FCC's cable jurisdiction.'7 5 Unlike the NARUC court, however, the
Home Box Office court did not confine its search to the provisions of the
Communications Act. Instead, that court recognized that established FCC
policies should be available not only to support FCC regulation of cable, but
to limit it as well. Specifically, the Home Box Office court would have required the FCC to consider the impact of its pay cable rules on "its otherwise
long-standing policy favoring diversification of control of programming
76
choices."1
Thus the Home Box Office case broadened the relevant legal inquiries
into the FCC's cable television rulemaking. As such, the opinion was a fair
response to the Midwest Video plurality. Southwestern Cable, read narrowly,
would only have allowed the FCC to look to policies embodied in its
statutory mandate for authority over cable companies. Midwest Video permitted the FCC to raise self-generated policies as support for its cable jurisdiction. Equity then demanded that opponents litigating the validity of FCC
rules be allowed to demand that the courts at least consider long-established
policies tending to undermine the FCC's rulemaking rationale.
Home Box Office, however, did not stop there. Read broadly, Home
Box Office authorized a more zealous search for constraints on the FCC's
ancillary jurisdiction over the cable industry. 77 The court said that the first
172. Compare Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Amendments Relative to CATV,
23 F.C.C. 2d 825 (1970) with Fourth Report and Order, In re Subscription Television, 15
F.C.C. 2d 466 (1968).
173. The court confined its discussion of the subscription television rules to the changes
in the rules since they were upheld. Concluding that the amendments were unimportant or
for the better, the court concluded that the rules should be reaffirmed since 'NA TO had
foreclosed reconsideration of certain issues. NA TO is also discussed for its interpretation of
the Communications Act. 567 :F.2d at 32-34.
174. 533 F.2d 601, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
175. See generally note 177 infra.
176. 567 F.2d at 40.
177. This point may be ascertained as the result of a creative reading of the case. These
policy themes are discussed by the court to a great extent under its section on the evidentiary issues. Id. at 34-43. The first amendment issues are discussed under still another
section. Id. at 43-51. Nevertheless, if the court intended that evidentiary issues be separated
from jurisdictional issues, so that the court might have jurisdiction over cable television,
but possibly not the evidentiary support for its rules, it provides little guidance in that
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amendment, for instance, required that the FCC's rules be drawn narrowly
and be based on regulatory goals evincing an "important or substantial
governmental interest . a requirement which translates in the rulemaking
context into a record that convincingly shows a problem to exist ....

17

The court also indicated that consideration of anti-competitive effects under
the antitrust laws was also a significant factor influencing the propriety of
the FCC's cable rulemaking. The court would have required development of
a substantial record demonstrating concern and appreciation for the preservation and promotion of competition.179 Perhaps most importantly, the Home
Box Office court viewed the due process/substantial evidence requirement,
read in light of the "ancillary jurisdiction" doctrine, as creating a presumption in favor of an unregulated cable industry. According to the court, the
FCC's formulation of the best means to regulate cablecasting in order to
supplement over-the-air broadcasting was an "artificial narrowing of the scope
ground
of the regulatory problem [which is] arbitrary and capricious and ..
for reversal."18 0
By looking to such broad themes as the first amendment, the antitrust
laws, and the doctrines of due process and by elevating them to positions of
heightened cogency in the context of the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction power,
the Home Box Office court greatly broadened the relevant inquiries into the
FCC's rulemaking under its reasonably ancillary powers. Given that courts'
inquiries into agency action are traditionally limited, the approach seems
to raise serious problems."' It essentially places the court in a position where
its political judgment would replace that of the FCC. That stance is tantadirection. In fact, the court stated that the FCC's jurisdiction over cable television turns

on the nature of the record it establishes in the rulemaking proceeding. The court said, "we
hold today that the Commission has not established its jurisdiction on the record evidence
before it .

.

.

. [W]e do require that at a minimum the Commission, in developing its

cable television regulations, demonstrate that the objectives to be achieved by regulating
cable television are also objectives for which the Commission could legitimately regulate the
broadcast media. . . . Further, we require that the Commission state clearly the harm
which its regulations seek to remedy and its reasons for supposing that this harm exists.
Because our holding is so limited, it is possible that the Commission will, after remand,
be able to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites for regulating pay cable television." Id. at
34. There are other instances when the court asserted that the scope of the FCC's legitimate
power is bounded by its ability to muster evidence. Id. at 31-32. In effect, by requiring that
the FCC produce evidence of its policies to prove jurisdiction and by retaining the prerogative of determining whether that evidence is substantial, the court made a broad policyoriented inquiry into the propriety of the FCC's rules. Where jurisdictional and evidentiary
matters separate is impossible to ascertain.
178. 567 F.2d at 50 (following United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 267 (1968)).
179. 567 F.2d at 40-43. The petitioners, including the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, apparently did not sustain the burden of going forward with the evidence
on the anti-competitive issues and the court therefore refused to include that rationale as
an independent ground for invalidating the pay cable rules. d. at 40. The court's treatment of the anti-competitive issues suggests that they might not have the elevated significance
in the ancillary jurisdiction context that the first amendment would have.
180. 567 F.2d at 36.
181. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
U.S. -,
98 S.Ct. 1197, 1207-15 (1978); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
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mount to admitting that the results are unpredictable, which seems highly
undesirable given the broad impact and broad economic consequences of
the FCC rules. Certainty in this area of the law is crucial.
Perhaps recognizing that the Home Box Office result was desirable on
policy grounds, but legally unnecessary, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Midwest Video Corp. v. F.C.C.1 8 2 (hereinafter Midwest Video II) recently
refused to engage in the open-ended policy search that Hopne Box Office
adopted. In Midwest Video II, a cable operator attacked the FCC's "access"
of
rules. When promulgated in 1972, the access rules had been the heart 83
the FCC's program to have cable television "realize some of [its] potential."'
Cable television interests, however, had asserted that there was little demand
for access services and that the cost of compliance with the rules drained
cable system revenues and discouraged financing of new plants and services.
8M
The ultimate effect, they argued, was to suppress cable expansion. Nevertheless, the FCC in 1976 reaffirmed its commitment to the requirement of access
channels while making only minor revisions directed at softening the
85
economic burden of meeting the rules.
The "dispositive issue" for the unanimous Midwest Video II court was
86
Emwhether the FCC had jurisdiction to promulgate the access rules.
phatically, the court said it did not. It rejected the FCC's argument that it
5
was vested with "sweeping jurisdiction" over cable television.' ' Rather,
following the language in NARUC, the court said that "whatever jurisdiction [the FCC] may have is contingent upon its delegated powers," and 88that
"each attempt to regulate cable systems must be individually justified."'
Although the FCC had argued that several provisions of the Communications Act supported its authority, the court rejected these arguments as
spurious.18 9 Further, the court read narrowly the Southwestern Cable and
Midwest Video decisions holding that the FCC might regulate cable with
a view to protecting or pursuing its goals:
182. 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978).
183. Cable Television Report and Order, In re Amendment Relative to CATV, 36 F.C.C.
2d 143, 189 (1972).
184. See Walsh, CATV: Let the Cables Grow, 55 MARQ. L. Rxv. 205, 231 (1972).
185. 59 F.C.C. 2d 294 (1976), reconsiderationdenied, 62 F.C.C. 2d 399 (1976).
186. 571 F.2d at 1035. The court also discussed "constitutional considerations," including
first amendment and due process issues, but clearly stated that it was unnecessary to do so.
Id. at 1052. A similar treatment was given to matters of evidence. Id. at 1059-63. Judge
Webster joined only the part of the court's opinion which treated the jurisdictional issues.
He indicated that he was in general agreement with the court's discussion of the other
issues but thought it unnecessary to discuss them. Id. at 1063. Unlike Home Box Office,
the jurisdictional and evidentiary issues appear analytically separable. The Midwest Video II
court, nonetheless, acknowledged that its analysis of the constitutional issues "are such as
to reinforce our conclusions on the jurisdictional issue." 571 F.2d at 1053.
187. 571 F.2d at 1037.
188. Id. at 1039. In acknowledging that it was not dealing with a "normal" breadth
of delegation question, the court drew an interesting analogy between the "reasonably
ancillary" standard and the "necessary and proper" clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 18. The
court interpreted these as allowing the FCC and Congress, respectively, to "carry into execution" powers which they had otherwise been specifically delegated. 571 F.2d at 1036 n.25.
189. 571 F.2d at 1036 n.25.
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Because the free public access concept.., has nothing to do with retransmission of broadcast signals on existing channels, the relationship of interaction between cable and broadcast systems present in
Southwestern and Midwest Video is totally absent here. The present
rules are not designed to govern some deleterious interrelationship
of cable systems to broadcasting, or to require that cable systems do
what broadcasters do, but relate to cable systems alone, and are designed to force them into activities not engaged in or sought; activities
having no bearing, adverse or otherwise, on the health and welfare of
broadcasting. 9 0
In fact, the goals that the FCC had cited in support of the access rules such
as increased outlets and augmented program choice, were essentially the
same as those approved by the plurality in.Midwest Video to support the
mandatory origination rule.' 91 Nevertheless, the Midwest Video 11 court rejected those goals as mere "objectives" which could not be "divorced from
the context of broadcasting" without losing their power as a basis for the
Commission's cable jurisdiction. 9 2
In distinguishing goals from objectives, the Midwest Video II court was
clearly concerned with the open-endedness of the "reasonably ancillary"
jurisdiction doctrine as the FCC had sought to interpret it.
The fundamental principle that governmental agencies are limited
to the exercise of power delegated by the Congress would be nullified
if an agency... were at liberty to expand its jurisdiction, as far and
wide as it wished, by the facile, case-by-case step of re-writing the objectives found in the delegating statute. If "jurisdiction" be synony-

190. Id. at 1058.

191. See 406 U.S. 649, 667-68. In fact, the access rules were historically closely related

to the mandatory origination rule. See Report and Order, In re Cable Television Annual
Fees, 49 F.C.C. 2d 1090 (1974).
192. The court's distinction between objectives and goals is elusive. Apparently, objectives are purposes internally generated by the Commission, but having only an indirect
relationship to statutory objectives stated in Section 1. In contrast, goals seem to be the
equivalent of statutory objectives. But the court placed heavy reliance on the fact that,
in its brief, the FCC had not formulated the question presented as whether the rules
were designed "to further the achievement of long-established regulatory goals in the field
of television broadcasting by increasing the number of outlets .. ." (the express language
from the Midwest Video plurality opinion). Instead, the FCC had argued' that the question
was simply "whether the rules are a 'reasonable exercise of agency authority to promote
statutory objectives."' Apparently this was not enough. The court stated: "We are cited
to no instance in which 'increasing outlets' and 'augmenting choices' have themselves been
approved as jurisdiction-spawning goals." The Midwest Video II court never indicated
who must approve such goals if they are to support jurisdiction. If the court meant the
Supreme Court, that would indicate only an extremely narrow reading of Midwest Video.
Even so, in this area the Supreme Court has only the power to interpret the law and not
to create it. A statutory basis for jurisdiction should be required. See 571 F.2d at 1040-41.
Cf. 567 F.2d at 84 (Commission need not find express statutory authority for its cable
regulations); Brookhaven Cable TV v. Kelley, 573 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1978), discussed at notes
197-205 infra and accompanying text (holding that cable regulation is valid where designed

to promote diversity).
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mous with agency drafted, ad hoc "objectives,"
Courts become essentially superfluous. 193

Congress and the

In particular, the court rejected the FCC's contention that cable systems
could be required to construct expensive facilities and hold them out for use
by others because they generally made use of retransmitted broadcast signals,19 4
or because the FCC had "unsupported visions" of cable's potential which it

hoped to encourage. 95 The court asserted that "[a] cable system is on this
record a private enterprise."' 96
Shortly after the Eighth Circuit's Midwest Video I1 decision, the Second
97
Circuit Court of Appeals decided Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelley.1
98
In that case, several cable television operators' challenged New York State's
regulation of pay cable television rates on grounds that the FCC had preempted the area. 9 9 The state, relying on NARUC, Home Box Office, and
Midwest Video 11,200 argued, inter alia, that the FCC had no jurisdiction to
preempt the state's regulation. The court, however, found those cases readily
20
distinguishable and upheld the cable interests' position.
Following Midwest Video, the court found that the crucial inquiry was
whether the FCC's rules served the long-established goals in increasing program diversity in television broadcasting. 202 In NARUC, the Brookhaven
court said, that the FCC had failed to demonstrate that the diversity goal
was promoted.20 3 In Home Box Office also, according to the Brookhaven court,
the FCC's regulation had failed because the intent had not been to promote
diversity, but merely to discourage competition.204 Additionally, the access
rules rejected in Midwest Video II were simply too intrusive. They were
an attempt to impose common carrier obligations on cable operators in contravention of specific rules prohibiting the FCC from creating such duties.' 0 5
The Brookhaven court's discussion of the previous circuit court cases is
simplistic. Thus, the opinion's lack of analysis renders it worthy of little attention, notable only as a further indication of the uncertainty that has developed
in this area of the law. Certainly in Home Box Office, the ultimate goal of
the FCC's anti-siphoning regulations had not been to lessen competition. Discouraging competition was an intermediate goal which the FCC believed,
however incorrectly, would encourage television service in the public interest.
Further, the Eighth Circuit in Midwest Video II did not find the access rules
offensive simply because they were burdensome. Midwest Video 1I demanded
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

571 F.2d at 1041-42.
Id. at 1043-44.
Id. at 1044-45.
Id. at 1043.
Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelley, 573 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 766.
Id. at 766-67.
Id. at 767-68.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 767.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 768.
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a statutory basis for the FCC's cable regulation before the reasonableness inquiry became relevant. Brookhaven, however, ignored that statutory analysis
while casually adopting the permissive position of the Midwest Video plurality,
pausing only to emphasize the importance of the goals of increasing program
outlets and improving viewers' program choice. Thus, the Brookhaven court
suggests a reconciliation of preceeding cases with a focus on the relationship
of the FCC's cable television regulation to the single goal of improving program diversity. This test is modified by an inquiry into whether the regulation
is overly burdensome. The reconciliation, however, is unappealing. Brookhaven's distinctions of previous circuit cases is questionable; its test gives
essentially the same carte blanche to the FCC allowed by the Midwest Video
plurality from which the other circuits have departed. In essence, the Brookhaven opinion represents the most honest application of the Midwest Video
opinion, but amounts to a clear rejection of the trend followed in other
circuits.
RECONCILLIATION OF THE CASMS

Under the Midwest Video II view of the FCC's cable jurisdiction, legitimate FCC regulation of cable would look only to Sections 151 and 303(g) of
the Communications Act, pertaining respectively to the FCC's purposes and
to its powers and duties, as the source of its policy objectives.o 6 The Midwest
Video 11 opinion, consequently, looks in a direction different from Home
Box Office, which had continued to recognize the vitality of the Midwest
Video plurality opinion, and which only overcame the result that Midwest
Video seemed to demand by a questionable use of precedent and by an undesirable mode of analysis.2 0 7 Midwest Video II suggests a return to an
analysis resembling that used in Southwestern Cable. Midwest Video II,
Southwestern Cable, and also NARUC, seem to require a firm statutory
foundation for the FCC's cable rulemaking.208 Moreover, given the language
of the Communications Act, an extension of the FCC's cable jurisdiction to
the regulation of cable operator activities that do not directly use or affect
incoming broadcast signals and their subscribers' capacity to receive them,
appears inconsistent with Midwest Video II's strict interpretation of Southwestern Cable. Meanwhile, the Midwest Video II analysis would achieve the
Home Box Office result..
Midwest Video, in contrast, seems to stand for the proposition .that the
FCC may regulate aspects or functions of cable. that .do not directly use the
signals of broadcasters. Under Midwest Video, the FCC apparently may con206. 571 F.2d at 1037-38. The court combined the Midwest Video plurality's reliance

on these sections with Chief Justice Burger's "strains the outer limits" statement to reach
the conclusion that those sections were the sole sources of authority for the FCC. But cf.
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 1.S. 157, 174 (1968) (47 U.S.C. §§303(0, (i),
and 307(b) are sources of authority). See also 571 F.2d at 1036 n.25 (rejecting the FCC's
arguments that jurisdiction could be based on §§152, 153, 154(i), 154(j), 301, 303, 307, 508,
809, 315, and 317 of the Communications Act).
207. See text accompanying notes 168-180 supra.
208. See text accompanying notes 88-93, 141.145; and 187-193 supra.
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sider the overall impact of cable on its national communications plans and
regulate cable television accordingly. The Midwest Video plurality did attempt
to limit the FCC's cable jurisdiction by restricting it to serving long-established
regulatory goals in television broadcasting. That standard, however, has not
proved meaningful. Faced with the fundamental proposition that the FCC's
cable jurisdiction is not unbounded, the courts, with the exception of the
Brookhaven court, have employed unsatisfactory reasoning to distinguish
Midwest Video and to put teeth into the constraints that the Supreme Court
sought to establish.
It is especially difficult to reconcile Home Box Office or Midwest Video 11
with the Supreme Court's holding in Midwest Video. Home Box Office's
treatment of Midwest Video, relying on a highly suspect analogy, and ignoring
a case that was on point, must be regarded as spurious. Midwest Video 11
presents a more palatable analysis, but because the Midwest Video plurality
essentially said that the legality of the FCC's rules would turn on their underlying goals or objectives, Midwest Video and Midwest Video IH are difficult
to reconcile. Both the mandatory origination rule and the access rules were
designed to further the same regulatory policies - the promotion of local
outlets for speech and increasing the diversity of speech. Moreover, the
Midwest Video II court's distinction between the factual situations presented
by the two cases relies greatly on reasoning used by the Midwest Video
dissent, which found the rules to be invalid because they required affirmative
209
acts and expenditures.
A point of greater merit made by the Midwest Video II court was that
the access rules were an attempt to convert cable systems into common
carriers - a forbidden practice under the Communications Act, according to
the court. 210 This point once again, however, calls attention to the unique
characteristics of cable television and demonstrates that cable operations may
perform two basic functions. In one role, the cable company may operate as
a functional extension of the interstate broadcasting system, as a terminal
and a conduit for broadcast signals. In another, the cable company operates
a local, self-contained transmission system. That functional distinction could
separate the District of Columbia and Eighth Circuit decisions from Southwestern Cable: despite Midwest Video, the recent circuit court decisions in
NARUC, Home Box Office and Midwest Video 1I have held that the FCC
may not regulate cable operators except in their use of signals that are taken
off-the-air.
Perhaps the trend within the circuits towards narrowing the legitimate
scope of the FCC's cable jurisdiction conforms with current policy preferences. Broad dissatisfaction now exists with the performance of the federal
209. The Midwest Video II court said that the access rules were invalid, while the
mandatory rules were not, because the former required "extensive and expensive construction, and equipment purchase and installation." 571 F.2d at 1039. The court also said
that, under the access rules, "cable operators can have no discretion or responsibility for
program content, may make essentially no change, and are forced to act like common
carriers," whereas the mandatory origination rule had only required that they act like
broadcasters. Id.

210. 571 F.2d at 1050-52 (citing 47 U.S.C. §153(h)).
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regulatory agencies generally and with the performance of the FCC in particular.211 The FCC's cable rules have been the subject of several proposals
for deregulation.212 Nevertheless, until the Supreme Court expressly confirms
this trend in the circuit courts, the state of the law remains unsettled.
The circuit decisions might be reconciled with Midwest Video by
acknowledging that in Midwest Video, the Supreme Court was evenly divided,
and that therefore the party that "controls" Chief Justice Burger's vote, controls
the Court. Burger's Midwest Video concurrence suggests that the FCC's cable
jurisdiction is defeasible, contingent upon cable television's continued retransmission of broadcast signals and upon continued congressional inaction.213
Consideration of events that have occurred since Midwest Video, however,
reveals that the conditions under which the Midwest Video decision was made
have changed substantially.
For purposes of meeting Burger's Midwest Video concurrence, Congress
can be said to have "acted" by passing the Copyright Law of 1976 which
requires that cable television operators pay for retransmission of broadcast
signals.2 1 .4 The significance of the copyright area to FCC regulatory authority
lies in the historical role of copyright law in cable television regulation. 2 1 5 The
FCC's original regulatory interest in cable had been based in large part on
cable's "unfair" competition which the FCC saw as a threat to the national
broadcast systems. The "unfairness" of that competition grew from two Supreme Court decisions,210 which held that cable retransmissions were essentially exempt from copyright liability. Those Supreme Court decisions
were made during a time when a new copyright law was pending in Congress.2 7
Not until 1976 was a new copyright law passed. In the interval, the FCC
211. See notes 18-21 supra and accompanying text.
212. See Draft Cable Television Legislation proposed by the Office of Telecommunication Policy (August 1975), reprinted in P. M cAvoy, supra note 19, at 13; Draft Cable

Television Legislation, proposed by the Department of Justice (June 1975), reprinted in
P. MAcAvoY, supra note 19, at 120. However, although both of these proposed statutes
are characterized as "deregulatory" in nature, they both confer substantial powers over
cable television upon the FCC.
213. See text accompanying notes 124-127 supra.
214. 17 U.S.C. §111 (1977). See generally Botein, News Copyright Act and Cable Television-A Signal of Change, 24 BuLL. CR. Soc. 11 (1976); Note, The New Copyright Law
and Cable Television, Interpretationand Implications, 7 PEns. ARTS REv. 176 (1977).
215. See generally, Marke, United States Copyright Revision and Its Legislative History,
20 L. Lm. J. 121; Brennan, Some Observations on the Revision of the Copyright Law from
the Legislative Point of View, 24 BULL. CR. Soc. 151 (1976).
216. Teleprompter, Inc. v. C.B.S., Inc., 415 U.S. 894 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United

Artists, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
217. A bill to revise the copyright law was first introduced in 1964. H.R. 11947, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). It did not pass. Once again, in 1967, in the 90th Cong., a bill was
introduced in the House and passed. H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967). But the
companion bill, S.597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), failed in the Senate. Several bills were
introduced in subsequent sessions, but were blocked by industrial interests dissatisfied with
the provisions on cable. Marke, supra note 215 at 125-37. The final bill, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90
Stat. 2541 (1976) was passed only after the affected industries collaborated and reached a
broader agreement. Id. See generally Consensus Agreement, Cable Television Report and
Order, 36 F.C.C. 2d 143, 284 (1972).
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established and expanded its cable jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court heard
and decided Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video. Those cases each cited
cable's retransmission activity as a legitimate reason for regulation. Thus, when
the Copyright Law of 1976 was enacted, imposing liability on cable companies
for their use of broadcast signals, the regulatory environment in which the
Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video cases had been decided was substantially changed.

218

The courts generally have rejected the invitation to draw inferences from
Congress' failure to enact a law with respect to the FCC's cable jurisdiction. 219
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger apparently viewed congressional inaction
as highly significant, reasoning that the FCC ought to have broad authority
over cable unless Congress acts. The issue in the wake of the 1976 Copyright Act is whether Congress has now "acted."
Because of its context, the Chief Justice's statement probably reflects an
anticipation of an amendment to the Communications Act and not to the
Copyright Act. Neither the statute itself 220 nor the comments of congressmen and staff indicate that the enactment of the law was intended to trigger
the defeat of the FCC's cable television jurisdiction. 221 Nevertheless, some
congressmen apparently did contemplate that the law would prompt a reconsideration or withdrawal of certain of the FCC's cable regulations. The FCC
has responded by opening an inquiry into its syndicated program exclusivity
roles.222 Because of the historical significance of the copyright issue in the
FCC's regulation of cable, the congressional solution to cable's unfair competition should fulfill Burger's precondition for the defeasance of the FCC's
broad cable jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court has now twice considered the scope of the
FCC's regulation over cable television, its opinions have failed to create
certainty in the area. Dissatisfaction with the FCC's cable policies, and the
need to establish jurisdictional standards to limit the FCC's open-ended "ancillary jurisdiction" authority have moved two circuit courts to apply Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video creatively, seeking an optimal solution.
In another circuit, the court applied Midwest Video mechanically failing
218. One commentator suggested: "To a very real extent, the Court may have preferred regulation to litigation as a means of dealing with increasingly complicated problems
of intermedia as well as intermodal competition, and assumed, incorrectly but not unjustifiably, that new copyright legislation would follow hard on the heels of its decision."
Botein, The New Copyright Act and Cable Television -A Signal of Change, 24 BULL. CR.
Soc. 1, 2 (1976).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 170; Midwest Video
Corp. v. F.C.C.. 571 F.2d at 1036.
220. 17 U.S.C. §801(2)(b); §l1l(d)(2)(b) (1977). The Copyright Act clearly contemplated
continuing authority of the FCC over cable's use of broadcast signals. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 176 (1976).
221. See Brennan, Some Obscrvations on the Revision of the Copyright Law from the
Legislative Point of View, 24 BULL. CR. Soc. 151, 154 (1976).
222. See note 23 supra.
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